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ABSTRACT
Freedom in Kant’s Critical Philosophy: The Keystone of Pure Reason. (May 2010)
Timothy James Aylsworth, B.A., Texas A&M University;
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Stephen Daniel
The objective of my thesis was to examine Kant’s concept of freedom and the
role that it plays in his Critical philosophy. Each section deals with an interpretive
or theoretical problem concerning freedom in the context of one of Kant’s Critiques.
In Section 2, I focus the Critique of Practical Reason and I argue that transcendental
freedom is a crucial premise in Kant’s deduction of the moral law. In Section 3, I turn
to the Critique of Pure Reason, where Kant claims that transcendental idealism is
the theoretical apparatus that allows us to understand the compatibility of freedom
and determinism. Because the first Critique lays the foundation for the rest of the
Critical project, I try to develop a reading of this text that can sustain the viability
of Kant’s concept of freedom. In Section 4, I look to the Critique of the Power
of Judgment, which Kant wrote in order to bridge the gap between nature, as it
was described in the first Critique and freedom, as it was developed in the second
Critique. Kant’s teleological account of nature, which subordinates nature to the
moral use of freedom, bridges the gap between nature and freedom by providing an
account of how nature can realize the objective end of practical reason, viz., the
highest good.
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11. INTRODUCTION:
FREEDOM AS THE KEYSTONE OF PURE REASON
In the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant says that “the concept of freedom,
insofar as its reality is proved by an apodictic law of practical reason, constitutes the
keystone of the whole structure of a system of pure reason, even of speculative reason”
(5:3-4).1 The objective of my thesis is to examine Kant’s concept of freedom and the
role that it plays in each of his Critiques. Although freedom is treated differently
in each Critique, I argue that this concept, nevertheless, acts as a connecting thread
throughout his critical philosophy.
Kant’s most detailed analysis of freedom is given in the Critique of Practical
Reason. There, he argues that our knowledge of the moral law entails that we must
be free (from the standpoint of practical reason). The first Critique, which describes
the laws of nature and the transcendental conditions of experience, is meant to
serve as a propaedeutic for this claim. In order to maintain his argument about
the reality of freedom from the standpoint of practical reason, Kant must show
that freedom is not impossible from the standpoint of speculative reason. The first
Critique plays a vital role for Kant’s moral philosophy by employing transcendental
idealism to demonstrate the possible compatibility of transcendental freedom with
natural, empirical causation.
The first and second Critiques create a gap between nature, as it was described
in the first Critique, and freedom, as it is worked out in the second. Thus, in
This thesis follows The Chicago Manual of Style.
1All translations of the Critique of Practical Reason are taken from Immanuel Kant, Practical
Philosophy, trans. Mary J. Gregor (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 133-
271. For references to Kant’s work (except for the Critique of Pure Reason) I cite the volume
and page numbers from the German Academy Edition of Kants gesammelte Schriften, 29 Vols.
(Berlin: Walter de Gruyter [and predecessors], 1902-). For references to the first Critique, I adopt
the convention of citing the first and second edition page numbers by means of the A/B notation.
2the third Critique Kant endeavors to bridge this gap, claiming that our faculty of
reflective judgment makes us aware of the unity of the laws of nature and freedom.
In the third Critique, Kant concludes that nature is teleologically subordinated to
the moral use of freedom. In each section, I address a particular interpretative or
theoretical problem in order to better understand how the concept of freedom fits in
as the keystone of Kant’s architectonic.
In Section 2, I focus on the Critique of Practical Reason. I argue that Kant mit-
igates a substantial obstacle to his practical philosophy by including transcendental
freedom as a premise of the second Critique. Henry Allison claims that this premise
provides an answer to criticisms raised by Bruce Aune and other commentators who
have argued that Kant’s move in the Groundwork from the “practical law” to the
“moral law” (i.e., the move from mere conformity with universal law to the cate-
gorical imperative) requires further argumentation, which Kant fails to supply.2 I
assent to Allison’s claim that transcendental freedom bridges the gap between the
practical and moral law and that this is crucial if we are to understand the role
of transcendental freedom in the second Critique. I argue, however, that Allison’s
argument requires further analysis of Kant’s form and matter distinction and its role
in connecting a maxim’s legislative form with its compliance with the categorical
imperative.
Because Kant attributes such importance to transcendental freedom in his prac-
tical philosophy, this concept requires adequate support from his speculative philos-
ophy. Hence, in Section 3, I turn to the Critique of Pure Reason, which provides
2See Bruce Aune, Kant’s Theory of Morals (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979),
28-34. See also Henry E. Allison, Kant’s Theory of Freedom (Cambridge [England]: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 1990), 210-213. Allen Wood presents another version of this objection and attributes
it to Hegel. See Allen W. Wood, Hegel’s Ethical Thought (Cambridge [England]: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 1990), 161-164. Thomas Hill also mentions this objection. See Thomas Hill, “Kant’s
Argument for the Rationality of Moral Conduct,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 66 (1985), 19.
3the essential argumentation needed to make transcendental freedom a theoretically
tenable position. In the third antinomy, Kant claims that the distinction between
things in themselves (noumena) and appearances (phenomena) shows how transcen-
dental freedom can be made compatible with empirical causality. Thus, in order
to understand his resolution of the antinomy, we must develop an interpretation of
transcendental idealism that can sustain his view of freedom.
I argue that the two-world thesis, which understands the distinction between
noumena and phenomena to be an ontological one, makes it impossible to render a
coherent picture of transcendental freedom. If we acknowledge Kant’s claim that the
intelligible self is atemporal, then it becomes impossible to connect a timeless act of
the intelligible self with a temporal act of the empirical self. Instead, I argue that the
two-aspect view, which takes the division between noumena and phenomena to be an
epistemological distinction, allows us to understand how we can simultaneously con-
nect an atemporal, intelligible cause to a temporal, empirical cause. This becomes
possible because the simultaneity, which Kant demands, is not a temporal conver-
gence of two series; rather, explanations of certain events require a simultaneous
conjunction of (A) the demand for the unconditioned as a transcendental condition
of experience and (B) the empirical phenomenon. I argue that the two-aspect view
is more conducive to this interpretation of simultaneity than the two-world position.
In Section 4, I focus on the the third Critique, and I am particularly concerned
with Part II, which deals with teleological judgment. In this text, Kant sets out
to demonstrate the unity of the laws of nature and freedom. It is not, however,
a recapitulation of the compatibility of freedom and empirical causality, which was
presented in the third antinomy of the first Critique. Instead, Kant’s project in the
third Critique is to show how the laws of nature, given in the first Critique, and the
laws of freedom, given in the second Critique, can be understood, not as two discrete
4systems, but as a coherent unity.
Even though it is freedom’s apparent conflict with nature that creates the dilemma,
Kant relies on freedom, once again, to bridge the gap between the two. He argues
that our judgment of the purposiveness of nature as a systematic whole leads us to
conclude that the final end of nature is human freedom. Echoing the conclusions of
the second Critique, Kant states in the Critique of the Power of Judgment that the
ultimate end that freedom gives itself is the highest good. Nature is teleologically
structured such that it can realize the ends of freedom, namely the highest good.
Kant’s guiding question for the third Critique asks, “What may I hope?” His answer
is that we can hope that nature sustains the possibility of the highest good in the
world.
52. FREEDOM IN THE CRITIQUE
OF PRACTICAL REASON:
THE DEDUCTION OF THE MORAL LAW
The Critique of Practical Reason is the focal point of Kant’s treatment of free-
dom. It is in the second Critique that Kant develops the inextricable connection
between freedom and the moral law. He says that the first question concerning the
determining ground of the will is whether or not the causality of freedom “does in fact
belong to the human will” (5:15). Only on this condition is it possible for reason to
be the determining ground of the will such that it is not the heteronomous product
of empirical causality.
Furthermore, the concept of freedom in the second Critique supplements the
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals by providing an argument that is absent
in the Groundwork. In particular, Bruce Aune argues that the Groundwork fails to
justify the move from the practical law, which is defined as “conformity of actions
as such with universal law” to the moral law, which in its first, negative formula-
tion states, “I ought never to act except in such a way that I could also will that
my maxim should become a universal law ” (4:402).3 The two concepts cannot be
equivalent, since, as Henry Allison notes, “the latter provides a decision procedure
for the choice of maxims whereas the former does not.”4 Nevertheless, Kant assumes
that the categorical imperative is either equivalent to or entailed by mere conformity
of actions with a universal law (4:402). Aune argues that this move requires further
argumentation that cannot be found in the Groundwork.5
Commentators have noted that this gap between the practical law and the moral
3Aune, Kant’s Theory of Morals, 28-34. All translations of the Groundwork of the Metaphysics
of Morals are taken from Kant, Practical Philosophy, 41-108.
4Allison, Kant’s Theory of Freedom, 210.
5Aune, Kant’s Theory of Morals, 28-34.
6law is no trivial matter.6 The problem is that someone could affirm the former while
rejecting the latter. As Allison points out, mere adherence to the practical law would
not proscribe all of the maxims that would be forbidden by the moral law. Allison
claims that the requirement of the practical law, which demands that one’s actions
conform to universal law, is not enough to rule out the possibility of rational egoism.7
The rational egoist could consistently maintain that acting in accordance with one’s
own self interest is a universal law insofar as she holds “that it would be reasonable for
every other agent in relevantly similar circumstances to adopt the same principles or
even that such agents ought to adopt them.”8 The moral law, however, goes beyond
this requirement and demands that the agent act in such a way that she could will
that her maxim become a universal law. The rational egoist fails to comply with the
moral law even though she passes the test of the practical law.9
Allison argues that the second Critique completes the enthymematic argument of
the Groundwork.10 Allison claims that the inclusion of transcendental freedom as an
explicit premise in the deduction of the second Critique is the move that mitigates
the force of Aune’s objection. He says that “transcendental freedom is precisely
the missing ingredient, which bridges the gap between the idea of conformity to
practical law as such. . . and the moral law as Kant defines it.”11 Allison points to
Kant’s remarks in §5, where Kant argues that the “mere lawgiving form of maxims is
6Aune gives this problem a significant amount of attention and claims that the project of pro-
viding an argument from the practical law to the moral law is ultimately a failure. Ibid. Allison
acknowledges that Aune’s objection points to a real difficulty, but he argues that it can, neverthe-
less, be resolved. Allison, Kant’s Theory of Freedom, 210-213. As noted in Section I, Allen Wood
and Thomas Hill also address this objection. See Wood, Hegel’s Ethical Thought, 161-164. See also
Hill, “Kant’s Argument for the Rationality of Moral Conduct,” 19.
7Allison, Kant’s Theory of Freedom, 211.
8Ibid., 205.
9Ibid., 206.
10Allison gives this argument in Kant’s Theory of Freedom, 210-213 and he presents the same
argument again in Idealism and Freedom. See Henry Allison, Idealism and Freedom (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1996), 143-154.
11Allison, Kant’s Theory of Freedom, 213.
7the only sufficient determining ground of a will” (5:28), in order to show how freedom
connects the practical law to the moral law.12
If the lawgiving form of a maxim, (i.e., its formal suitability as a universal law) is
the determining ground of the will, then the agent’s will must be determined without
being subject to any empirical conditions and is therefore transcendentally free. Al-
lison argues that the practical law inevitably leads to the legislative form of maxims,
which require transcendental freedom if they are to serve as the determining ground
of the will. Because Kant equates the “legislative form of maxims” with the require-
ment of universalizability given in the first formulation of the categorical imperative,
Allison argues that this deduction, which relies on transcendental freedom, succeeds
in connecting the practical law to the moral law.13
I believe that Allison is right to claim that transcendental freedom is a necessary
step in the connection between the practical and moral law. Nevertheless, Allison’s
argument is in need of further development before it can achieve its purported aim.
Specifically, I argue that the concept of a maxim must be considered in terms of its
formal and material components in order to understand why Kant can legitimately
equate the “legislative form of maxims” with their suitability as universal laws.
The form is nothing other than the universality of the imperative, and the matter
is the end or object that is to be effected. Because material objects are always
empirically conditioned, Kant claims that the form alone must be the determining
ground of the transcendentally free will. Hence, the legislative form of a maxim can
be nothing other than its universality.
Thus, in this section, I argue that transcendental freedom plays an important role
in Kant’s practical philosophy. Freedom is not merely required for moral responsi-
12Ibid., 212.
13Ibid., 213.
8bility, as the “ought implies can” dictum indicates; rather, Kant uses the concept of
transcendental freedom as a crucial premise in his deduction of the moral law.
2.1 Aune’s Objection: Kant’s Move from Practical Law to Moral Law
In the Groundwork, Kant argues that the will of a rational being must be moved
to act merely out of conformity with universal law and that no empirical end, like
happiness, can serve as the determining ground of the will. It is after reaching this
conclusion that Kant moves from conformity with universal law to the idea of the
moral law. He writes:
Since I have deprived the will of every impulse that could arise for it from
obeying some law, nothing is left but the conformity of actions as such
with universal law, which alone is to serve the will as its principle, that
is, I ought never to act except in such a way that I could also will that
my maxim should become a universal law. (4:402)
It is here, Aune argues, that Kant moves uncritically from the practical law to the
moral law. Aune defines these concepts in the following way:14
Practical Law (PL): Conform your actions to universal law.
Moral Law (ML): Act only on that maxim through which you can at the
same time will that it should become [or be] a universal law.
Allison gives a succinct reformulation of Aune’s objection:
Aune allows that Kant establishes the former [the PL] by showing that
it is a requirement of rational willing; but he contends that Kant either
mistakenly treats the latter [ML] as equivalent to it or assumes, without
argument, that it is readily derivable from it.15
14Although the definitions come from Aune, the labels “practical law” and “moral law” are the
ones that Allison uses in his discussion of Aune’s objection. See Aune, Kant’s Theory of Morals,
29. See also Allison, Kant’s Theory of Freedom, 210.
15Allison, Kant’s Theory of Freedom, 210.
9It is not likely that Kant took the PL and ML to be equivalent. As both Aune and
Allison point out, there are important practical differences between them.16 Aune
argues that the PL “is a higher-order principle telling us to conform to certain lower-
order laws” but that it does not help us determine what these lower-order laws are.17
Thus, the PL does not turn out to be a very useful principle.
Allison argues that the problem might be more serious than Aune realizes. He
claims that even a rational egoist, who believes that an action is rational only insofar
as it promotes her self-interest, could adopt the PL. For example, if a rational egoist
is faced with a decision between accepting or rejecting a bribe, the PL does nothing
to forbid her from making the wrong moral decision. She is consistent with the PL
as long as she believes that it would be reasonable for others in similar situations to
act in the same way, according to the universal law of self-interest. This, however,
is vastly different than willing that everyone else act in the same way. Thus, Allison
concludes that “there is a gap that needs to be filled, indeed, if it leaves room for
rational egoism, perhaps even a more serious gap than Aune and other friendly critics
realize.”18
Aune argues that the connection between the PL and ML could be established
by the premise that “we conform to universal law when and only when we act on
maxims that we can will to be universal laws.”19 Aune claims that this premise
would indeed demonstrate that the ML follows from the PL, but he argues that it
is not as obvious as Kant seems to assume. Thus, he tries to give an argument that
can justify this additional premise.
Aune’s argument turns on the logical form of maxims. Because every action is
16Ibid. See also Aune, Kant’s Theory of Morals, 30.
17Ibid.
18Allison, Kant’s Theory of Freedom, 211.
19Aune, Kant’s Theory of Morals, 32.
10
based on some maxim, Aune revises the PL and ML in order to include maxims. He
claims that an action conforms to the PL only if that action is based on a maxim that
conforms to universal law.20 Similarly, he says that an agent’s maxim, m, conforms
to the moral law only if she “can will that m or its generalization G(m), should be
a universal law.”21 Aune deliberately moves from talking about maxims to their
generalizations. He does so because he believes that “a maxim lacks the logical form
of a proper law; what one can will to be a practical law is, at best, the generalization
of a maxim.”22 Aune believes that maxims have the following logical form: “For any
action A, if A satisfies the condition C, I will do A.”23 Laws, on the other hand, have
a different form: “All A’s are necessarily B.”24
Aune’s claim that maxims must be generalized (in order to have the same logical
form as laws) does have some textual support. He points to a passage in the Critique
of Practical Reason where Kant moves from a maxim to its generalization in order to
test its conformity with the PL.25 In this remark on §4, Kant considers whether or not
a maxim that states “I will increase my wealth by every safe means” would conform
to universal law (5:27). In order to test this maxim, he evaluates an action that falls
under it, namely, he asks whether or not he should deny a deposit, the owner of
which has died without making any record of it (5:27). Both the description of the
action and the maxim on which it is based are initially indexed to a specific agent.
When he subjects this maxim to the test of the PL, however, he generalizes it by
saying, “everyone may deny a deposit which no one can prove has been made” (5:27).
As Aune points out, “though the maxim he is testing is expressed in the first-person
20Ibid., 30.
21Ibid.
22Ibid., 88.
23Ibid., 24.
24Ibid.
25Ibid., 25.
11
singular, the law he describes is fully general.”26
After giving this analysis of the nature of maxims and their generalizations, Aune
claims that the PL should say: “m (or an action on m) is consistent with universal
law just when G(m) is consistent with universal law.”27 This, however, is by no
means a logical truth.28 Aune claims that it is entirely conceivable that some maxim
(or some action based on that maxim) might conform to universal law even though its
generalization is incompatible with it.29 For instance, if the universal law is rational
egoism, then Kant’s denying the dead man’s deposit would conform to the law, but
the generalization of this action does not fare quite so well. As Kant rightly notes,
once this maxim is generalized, it would annihilate itself because there would no
longer be deposits at all (5:27). Since Aune argues that “the shift from talk about
maxims simpliciter to talk about generalized maxims”30 compels Kant to show that
a maxim conforms with universal law only if its generalization does, he concludes
that the project of connecting the PL to the ML is ultimately a failure.31
2.2 Allison’s Reply to Aune: The Importance of Transcendental Freedom
Allison agrees with Aune’s claim that there is a gap between the PL and ML. He
also concurs that the Groundwork fails to provide any argument connecting them.
Furthermore, as it was noted earlier, Allison believes that this problem, insofar as the
PL permits maxims and actions that the ML is meant to forbid, might be more serious
than Aune realizes.32 He also points out that, at least as far as the Groundwork is
concerned, Kant’s argument moves in the problematic way that Aune describes.
26Ibid., 25.
27Ibid., 88.
28Of course, the converse, which states that if G(m) is consistent with universal law, then m is
consistent, would certainly be a logical truth. Ibid.
29Ibid., 89.
30Allison, Kant’s Theory of Freedom, 211.
31Aune, Kant’s Theory of Morals, 89.
32Allison, Kant’s Theory of Freedom, 211.
12
Allison does, however, argue that the Critique of Practical Reason succeeds in
bridging the gap.33 The important difference is that the second Critique uses tran-
scendental freedom to connect the PL to the ML. He writes:
Fortunately, however, the situation is not as hopeless as it has so far
appeared. What has been neglected is that the argument of the second
Critique does not move straightforwardly from the concept of a practical
law to the categorical imperative as the only conceivable candidate for
such a law, but rather from this concept together with the assumption of
transcendental freedom.34
Allison claims that the inclusion of transcendental freedom in the deduction of the
moral law forges a bridge between the PL and the ML. In order to evaluate Allison’s
claim that transcendental freedom bridges the gap, we must first examine how he
defines this concept.
In his explication of transcendental freedom, Allison naturally begins with Kant’s
description of it in the second Critique, where he writes that transcendental freedom
“must be thought as independence from everything empirical and so from nature
generally” (5:97). Allison argues that this independence from nature is a necessary
condition of transcendental freedom, but he does not believe that it is a sufficient con-
dition.35 For example, an agent’s freedom might be limited to her capacity to freely
choose the means through which she effects ends that are empirically determined by
nature. In this case, “such an agent would be free, yet ineluctably heteronomous.”36
Hence, Allison argues that transcendental freedom requires a specifically Kantian
conception of autonomy according to which an agent has the capacity to set her own
ends without any empirical conditioning.37 As Kant puts it, “Autonomy of the will is
33Allison presents this argument in Kant’s Theory of Freedom, 210-213 and again in Idealism and
Freedom, 150-154.
34Allison, Idealism and Freedom, 151.
35Ibid., 152.
36Ibid.
37Ibid.
13
the property of the will by which it is a law to itself (independently of any property
of the objects of volition)” (4:440).38 Thus, for an agent to be transcendentally free,
she must be able to act and set ends for herself without any causal necessitation from
nature.
After providing this explication of freedom and autonomy, Allison proceeds to
his argument connecting the practical law to the moral law. First, Allison discusses
Kant’s requirement that a maxim be rationally justified. In order for a maxim to be
rationally justified, it “must not merely conform to an unconditional practical law, it
must be adopted because it conforms.”39 Allison highlights the fact that this is only
possible if the agent is transcendentally free.
Furthermore, in order for a maxim to be adopted on the grounds that it conforms
to universal law, the maxim “must be able to include itself as a ‘principle establishing
universal law,’ which is just to say that the maxim must have what Kant terms
‘legislative form.” ’40 The legislative form of a maxim is nothing other than the
maxim’s capacity to be generalized and established as a universal law. This, Allison
argues, is the crucial move that is needed to establish a connection between the
practical law and the moral law.
Essentially, Allison’s argument sets up a string of conditional statements. First,
if pure reason is practical, then it must be able to create maxims without being
empirically conditioned (i.e., the agent must be transcendentally free). Second, if the
adoption of a maxim is not empirically conditioned, then the grounds for adopting
this maxim must be its conformity with universal law. Third, if a maxim is adopted
on the grounds that it conforms to universal law, then this must in virtue of its
38This conception of autonomy squares nicely with the word’s etymology. It’s a compound of the
ancient Greek words auto (self) and nomos (law). Kant’s conception of autonomy requires that
the agent’s will be governed by law and that this law be given by the agent herself.
39Ibid.
40Ibid., 153.
14
legislative form. Finally, a maxim can have legislative form only if the agent can will
that the maxim become a universal law. Allison writes:
By this line of reasoning, then, which turns crucially on the assumption of
transcendental freedom, the apparently empty requirement to conform to
universal law. . . which presumably even the rational egoist could accept,
becomes the non-trivial requirement to select only those maxims which
you can also regard as suitable to be universal laws.41
Thus, Allison concludes that the second Critique succeeds where the Groundwork
fell short because of the inclusion of transcendental freedom as an explicit premise.
2.3 Kant’s Form and Matter Distinction
I believe that Allison is right to emphasize the importance of transcendental free-
dom in Kant’s deduction of the moral law. Nevertheless, I argue that his argument
connecting the PL to the ML is not complete unless it closely attends to the distinc-
tion between a maxim’s form and matter. According to the third step in Allison’s
argument, conformity to universal law can serve as the ground for adopting a maxim
only if the maxim has the proper legislative form. Allison neglects to demonstrate
why this conditional holds. In short, a maxim can be adopted on the grounds that it
conforms to universal law only after the maxim has been abstracted from all material
components (i.e., ends which are to be effected) such that nothing remains but the
form.
Every maxim can be broken down to its form and matter. The matter is the “ob-
ject whose reality of desired” (5:21). Such objects, however, are necessarily empirical
and thus cannot serve as the determining ground of a rational will. Kant writes:
If a rational being is to think of his maxims as practical universal laws, he
can think of them only as principles that contain the determining ground
of the will not by matter but only by their form. (5:27)
41Ibid., 153-154.
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Because desirable ends like happiness are empirically conditioned and are not equally
valid for all rational beings, it is impossible to make such ends the a priori principle
of universal law (5:21-22). Hence, in order to establish a universally valid practical
principle, the rational agent must evaluate maxims without any consideration of
desired ends.
Kant claims that we must either abandon the project of seeking a higher moral
principle or acknowledge the following principle:
Pure reason must be practical of itself and alone, that is, it must be
able to determine the will by the mere form of a practical rule without
presupposing any feeling and hence without any representation of the
agreeable or disagreeable as the matter of the faculty of desire. (5:24)
Given that desired material objects will inevitably vary from subject to subject, it
would be impossible to establish any universal law with such objects as the deter-
mining ground of the will.
The capacity establish a strictly formal principle as the determining ground of
the will is precisely the role of transcendental freedom in Kant’s deduction. Without
transcendental freedom, the objects of human desire (which are driven by natural
inclinations) would be the sole principle of human action. No agent could ever
act purely out of respect for the formal universality of her maxim. Her will would
necessarily be heteronomous.
The form of a maxim, which is to serve as the determining ground of the will,
is nothing other than its suitability to serve as a principle of universal law. This is
precisely what Kant is referring to in his discussion of the legislative form. Thus,
in order to successfully establish the connection between the PL and ML, Allison
needs to underscore the importance of the form/matter distinction and highlight the
necessity to consider a maxim in complete abstraction from material considerations.
16
2.4 Concluding Remarks
Aune, Allison, and Wood are right to be concerned about Kant’s move from the
practical law to the moral law. If Kant wishes to maintain that acting in accordance
with the moral law is the only way to conform one’s actions to universal law, then
this claim requires an argument establishing this connection. In the Groundwork,
Kant certainly moves from one to the other without providing such an argument.
Allison finds this argument in the Critique of Practical Reason, and he claims
that it is crucially dependent on the assumption of transcendental freedom. While I
believe that Allison is quite right in making this claim, he neglects an important facet
of transcendental freedom, viz., that it is what enables an agent to act strictly out of
respect for a maxim’s universalizability rather than out of desire for some material
object. Once Allison’s argument has been supplemented in this way, I believe that
it can stand as an adequate response to the criticism leveled by Aune and Wood.
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3. FREEDOM IN THE CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON:
AN OBJECTION TO THE TWO-WORLD VIEW
Kant is unequivocal about the importance of freedom for his practical philosophy
(5:96-98). Furthermore, he argues that this integral concept of his moral philosophy
ultimately rests upon the transcendental idea of freedom from the Critique of Pure
Reason (5:94-106). Thus, if his moral philosophy is to be placed on a firm foundation,
the transcendental idea of freedom must be theoretically tenable.
Given that transcendental idealism is the doctrine that grounds the transcenden-
tal ideas, any defense of Kant’s view of freedom requires a suitable interpretation
of this position. In this section, I focus on two interpretive approaches to transcen-
dental idealism and I evaluate their respective strengths and weaknesses in helping
us understand Kant’s take on freedom in the context of the third antinomy, where
Kant argues for the compatibility of antithetical positions concerning freedom and
determinism.
In Section 1, after giving a brief exposition of the third antinomy, its solution, and
the relevant considerations that give rise to the dilemma, I look to the “two-world”
view, which takes the distinction between things in themselves (noumena) and ap-
pearances (phenomena) to be a metaphysical one. In particular, I examine Allen
Wood’s exposition of this view.42 I argue that the two-world view makes it impossi-
ble to connect a timeless, intelligible act of choice with a temporal, empirical event
that it conditions. Because Kant asserts that we simultaneously discover an event’s
intelligible and sensible causes, Hud Hudson claims that Wood’s two-world under-
standing of this simultaneity amounts to the convergence of an atemporal, intelligible
series with a temporal, sensible series, which “is simply an outright contradiction.”43
42See Allen Wood, “Kant’s Compatibilism,” in Allen W. Wood, Self and Nature in Kant’s Phi-
losophy (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984), 73.
43See Hud Hudson, Kant’s Compatibilism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), 26.
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In Section 2, I argue that the contradiction that results from the two-world view
can be averted by adopting the alternative position known as the “one-world” or
“two-aspect” view, which understands the distinction between noumena and phe-
nomena to be an epistemological one that does not entail a metaphysical separation.
More specifically, I focus on Henry Allison’s formulation and defense of this view.44 I
suggest that the simultaneity, which Kant demands, is not a temporal convergence of
two series; rather, explanations of certain events require a simultaneous conjunction
of (A) the demand for an unconditioned cause as a transcendental condition of expe-
rience and (B) the empirical, phenomenal, cause. I argue that Allison’s two-aspect
view is more conducive to this interpretation of simultaneity than Wood’s two-world
position. For Allison, (A) and (B) are merely different epistemological perspectives,
which must be simultaneously posited in order to understand how certain events are
made possible for experience. I argue that the contradiction, which arises out of the
two-world view, is resolved by understanding the simultaneous conjunction of atem-
poral causation with temporal causation as epistemological rather than ontological.
Because the epistemological perspective avoids Hudson’s contradiction, I argue that
44See Henry E. Allison, Kant’s Transcendental Idealism (New Haven: Yale University Press,
2004), 3. Although I focus on Wood and Allison, there are, of course, many other scholars who
argue for these views. Lewis White Beck, Graham Bird, Ralf Meerbote, Arthur Melnick, Robert
Pippin, and Gerold Prauss all argue for some version of the two-aspect view. I have chosen Allison
because of his thorough treatment of Kant’s view of freedom and his robust defense of the two-aspect
theory’s importance in this respect. See Allison Kant’s Theory of Freedom. Similarly, Wood is by no
means the only or even the most vehement proponent of the two-world view. On the contrary, the
two-world view has, until recently, been a standard, textbook reading of Kant. I have selected Wood
because he succinctly states what he believes to be the important facets of Kant’s compatibilism,
and these criteria are the ones criticized by Hudson. Although I focus on Wood, P.F. Strawson
is sometimes seen Allison’s counterpart, who strongly advocates the two-world view. See P. F.
Strawson, The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (London: Methuen,
1966). There are other notable proponents of the two-world view, including Karl Ameriks, Moltke
Gram, T.E. Wilkerson, and Richard Aquila. Many of these scholars, however, already believe that
Kant’s commitments to the two-world view, necessary as they might be, commit him to various
contradictions. It is for this reason, among others, that I have singled out Wood’s account. For
a detailed discussion of these two positions and their supporters, see Karl Ameriks’ “Recent Work
on Kant’s Theoretical Philosophy” in Interpreting Kant’s Critiques, ed. Karl Ameriks (Oxford:
Clarendon, 2003), 67-97.
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the two-aspect interpretation of transcendental idealism yields a more tenable view
of freedom than the two-world view.
In Section 3, I consider Eric Watkins’ objections to the two-aspect view of free-
dom and offer some replies. Watkins claims that the “crucial move” made by the
two-aspect solution is the assertion that we cannot simultaneously view an event or
action from two standpoints, which prevents the possibility of coherently stating the
contradiction.45 I argue that this move, which he finds objectionable, is in no way
crucial to the two-aspect view of freedom. I claim that epistemological simultaneity
of the two standpoints is precisely what is required for a textually faithful and philo-
sophically defensible position. I deny Watkins’ assertion that one standpoint must be
true, while the other is illusory; rather, I argue that both standpoints make equally
true claims. In my defense of this position, I evaluate and reject Dana Nelkin’s ob-
jection that the idea of a standpoint is not intelligible and thus cannot serve as the
interpretive apparatus for Kant’s view of freedom.46 I conclude that in the context
of Kant’s view of freedom, the two-world view faces more formidable objections and
that the two-aspect view is preferable in this respect.
3.1 The Two-World View
The antinomies are central to Kant’s project in the Critique of Pure Reason
(CPR). Allison writes, “It is virtually impossible to overestimate the importance of
the Antinomy to Kant’s critical project.”47 Kant acknowledges this importance in
a famous letter to Christian Garve written in 1798, in which Kant writes that it
was the antinomies that “first aroused me from my dogmatic slumber and drove
45Eric Watkins, Kant and the Metaphysics of Causality (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University
Press, 2005), 321.
46Dana K. Nelkin, “Two Standpoints and the Belief in Freedom,” The Journal of Philosophy 97
(2000), 569.
47Allison, Kant’s Transcendental Idealism, 357.
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me to the critique of reason itself in order to resolve the ostensible contradiction
of reason with itself” (Br 12: 258).48 In the CPR, Kant intends to resolve these
contradictions, which stem from reason’s demand that we hold certain mutually
inconsistent positions.
Reason insists that “If the conditioned is given, then the whole sum of
conditions, and hence the absolutely unconditioned, is also given, through
which alone the conditioned was possible” (A409/ B436).49 In his explication of
this demand, Kant tells us to evaluate a series m, n, o, where n is the condition
of o and is conditioned by m. In order to understand n as the condition of o, we
must presume a series of preceding conditions (l, k, j, etc.) if we are to regard n as
given (A410/ B437). Kant is unwilling to concede an infinite regress of conditions,
because he claims that reason cannot be satisfied with an incomplete series. Thus, he
argues that reason is compelled to posit an unconditioned totality as a transcendental
condition of any conditioned series.
Given this demand for the unconditioned, in the thesis of the third antinomy,
Kant argues that the causality of the laws of nature cannot be the only one and that
we must assume freedom, as an absolutely unconditioned cause, in order to explain
certain appearances. In the antithesis, he claims that there is no freedom and that
natural causation is entirely sufficient, when an event is considered strictly as an
empirical phenomenon. These antithetical positions present us with an undesirable
contradiction, but reason is, nevertheless, able to resolve the conflict. Kant writes:
The antinomy of pure reason in its cosmological ideas is removed by
showing that it is merely dialectical and a conflict due to an illusion
arising from the fact that one has applied the idea of absolute totality,
48Kant to Garve, 21 September 1798, in Immanuel Kant, Correspondence, ed. and trans. Arnulf
Zweig (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 552.
49All translations of the Critique of Pure Reason are taken from Immanuel Kant, Critique of
Pure Reason, trans. Paul Guyer and Allen Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
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which is valid only as a condition of things in themselves, to appearances
that exist only in representation, and that, if they constitute a series, exist
in the successive regress but otherwise do not exist at all. (A506/B534)
The resolution of the antinomy relies on transcendental idealism, which distinguishes
between appearances (phenomena), which we know through experience, and things
in themselves (noumena), which are never given through experience. I am free qua
noumenal self, but I am determined qua phenomenal self. The contradiction only
arises when the subjectively necessary totality, which is merely a condition of the
noumena, is mistaken for an objective property of phenomena (A297/B353). In the
Critique of Practical Reason, Kant insists that the reader recall this particular insight
of the first Critique:
[T]he natural necessity which cannot coexist with the freedom of the sub-
ject attaches merely to the determinations of a thing which stands under
conditions of time and so only to the determinations of the acting sub-
ject as appearance. . . But the very same subject, being on the other side
conscious of himself as a thing in itself, also views his existence insofar as
it does not stand under conditions of time and himself as determinable
only through laws that he gives himself by reason. (5:97)
The self, when it is considered empirically, is in time and causally necessitated. The
self, insofar as it considered in the intelligible sense, is neither in time nor subject to
causal necessity.
In order to maintain Kant’s view of freedom, we must develop an interpretation of
transcendental idealism that can sustain this resolution of the third antinomy. This
task is complicated by Kant’s remarks that the atemporal, intelligible cause and the
temporal, empirical cause are to be discovered simultaneously in an action. Kant
writes:
Thus freedom and nature, each in its full significance would both be found
in the same actions, simultaneously and without any contradiction, ac-
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cording to whether one compares them with their intelligible or their
sensible cause. (A541/B569; emphasis added)
Interestingly, neither cause is found in a mitigated, incomplete sense; rather, each
cause is present in its “full significance.” This dispels any talk about the existence of a
real or illusory cause. Kant does not want to give the impression that freedom is the
real cause, that the natural, empirical cause is illusory, or vice versa. Furthermore,
the two seemingly incompatible causes are simultaneously found in an action. This
simultaneity requirement complicates the exegetical and philosophical task. With
these constraints in the background, we may turn to the interpretive debate between
the two-world view and the two-aspect view to evaluate their compliance with these
restrictions.
Wood argues that we can conceive of ourselves as simultaneously free and deter-
mined only if we understand that there are two ontologically distinct selves. The
noumenal self is free, but the empirical self is causally determined by the laws of
nature. Wood writes:
Kant’s compatibilism, however, is based on the aggressively metaphysical
distinction between phenomena and noumena; far from unifying our view
of ourselves, it says that freedom and determinism are compatible only
because the self as free moral agent belongs to a different world from that
of the self as natural object.50
In a certain sense, the two-world view is helpful in alleviating the contradiction
between the thesis and antithesis. If Kant does not have a unified view of the self,
then he is free to say that there is no contradiction, since freedom and determinism
are predicated of ontologically discrete entities. Wood also argues that Kant is
committed to the claim that humans have timeless agency. The self of the intelligible
world and its agency are not subject to time.51 Wood says:
50Wood, “Kant’s Compatibilism,” 75. (Emphasis Added)
51Ibid., 90.
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Time, however, is for Kant only a form of sensibility; only as phenomena
or appearances are we necessarily in time. As noumena or things in
themselves we are subject neither to time nor to the law of causality
which goes along with it.52
The difficulty lies in showing how these two conceptions of the self are compatible.
Particularly, in what sense does a timeless act of the intelligible self relate to the
temporal, empirical event?
Hudson argues that this question presents an insurmountable obstacle for Wood’s
account. Hudson claims that Wood’s two-world reading of Kant’s solution to the
third antinomy rests on three, inconsistent theses.53 He reconstructs Wood’s view in
the following way:
(i) Kant’s distinction between things in themselves and appearances is
an ontological, two-worlds one; (ii) the intelligible cause is the source
of causal efficacy, and the empirical cause, which is the effect of the
intelligible cause, is not sufficient for its effect in the world of appearance;
and (iii) human beings participate in timeless agency.54
As we have seen, Kant certainly endorses timeless agency, as the intelligible self is not
subject to time, yet it has the power to spontaneously effect a series of appearances
(A446/ B474). Hudson argues that this kind of timeless agency is incompatible with
Wood’s two-world position, when it is evaluated with respect to the requirement of
simultaneity. Hudson frames his objection as follows:
Suppose that some activity x is timeless. Then there is no time at which
x occurs. But if x is simultaneous with something y, x and y occur at the
same time. Thus there is no y such that x and y are simultaneous. In
short, to purchase compatibilism at the price of ignoring the incoherence
of timeless choices that are also simultaneous with empirical events seems
an awfully high price to pay.55
52Ibid.
53Hudson, Kant’s Compatibilism, 26.
54Ibid., 25.
55Ibid., 26.
24
Wood holds that there is a simultaneous convergence of an atemporal, intelligible
cause and a temporal event. Indeed, this seems to be “an outright contradiction.” If
there are two ontologically distinct selves simultaneously causing some action, then
we are faced with the impossible task of temporally uniting a timeless choice with
an empirical event in time.
I believe that Wood faces an undesirable decision. He can either affirm Hudson’s
formulation of simultaneity, which would commit him to the resulting contradiction,
or he can deny this formulation and claim that the simultaneity must refer to a
subjective simultaneity rather than an objective one. If he chooses the latter, then
this would essentially amount to an ad hoc acceptance of the two-aspect view in
order to avoid the two-world contradiction. The claim of the two-aspect view is
that the simultaneity is not between two ontologically discrete objects; rather the
simultaneous conjunction is of two epistemological perspectives within the subject.
I argue that we can make simultaneity and timeless agency compatible only if
we understand this simultaneity as epistemological rather than ontological. Wood’s
two-world position, however, excludes the possibility of this alternative conception of
simultaneity. If he is committed to the claim that the intelligible self and empirical
self are metaphysically distinct, then he is left with the unwelcome consequence that
simultaneity must refer to the temporal conjunction of two ontologically discrete
entities, one of which is in time, while the other is not. Although Wood rightly
retains the requirements of atemporality and simultaneity, we have to jettison the
two-world thesis if we wish to understand the compatibility of these demands.
3.2 The Two-Aspect View
Allison categorically rejects the two-world position.56 He believes that the two-
56Allison, Kant’s Transcendental Idealism, 3.
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aspect interpretation is pivotal for a proper understanding of transcendental idealism.
He writes:
[T]he distinction between the empirical and transcendental object, like
that between things as they appear and as they are in themselves, is not
between two ontologically distinct entities but between two perspectives
from which ordinary empirical objects may be considered.57
He says that that transcendental idealism “is more properly seen as epistemological
or perhaps ‘metaepistemological’ than metaphysical in nature, since it is grounded
in an analysis of the discursive nature of human cognition.”58 The term “metaepiste-
mological” seems appropriate here, considering that the transcendental distinction is
not simply something we know; rather, it provides meta-rules (transcendental con-
ditions), which make knowledge possible. Furthermore, it should be noted that we
can only view empirical objects from two perspectives. One perspective is the phe-
nomenal, which we are experience through intuition. The other is the transcendental
perspective, which identifies the conditions that make experience possible.
Allison argues that these are merely two epistemological perspectives through
which empirical objects are cognized. I argue that if there are not two ontologically
distinct selves, then the problem of simultaneity is mitigated. The contradiction
in Wood’s account stems from the incompatibility of the two-world thesis with the
simultaneity requirement. Allison’s one-world view does not take simultaneity to
be a convergence of ontologically distinct causes; rather, he argues that a complete
explanation of certain phenomena requires that we presuppose transcendental free-
dom at the same time that we intuit the empirical phenomenon. The simultaneity
is epistemological rather than ontological. The intelligible cause is still not subject
to time, but this no longer presents an insurmountable obstacle to simultaneity. We
57Ibid., 62.
58Ibid., 4.
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merely presuppose an unconditioned, atemporal cause in order to understand how
the phenomenon was made possible for experience.59 We make this presupposition
in simultaneous conjunction with the acknowledgment of the empirical cause. It is
important to bear in mind that this is precisely what Kant says about simultaneity.
He does not claim that freedom and nature simultaneously cause some event; rather,
freedom and nature are simultaneously found in an event (A541/B569). Because it
has the resources to avert Hudson’s alleged contradiction, Allison’s two-aspect theory
has an important advantage over the two-world position.
In addition to this theoretical advantage, I also contend that the two-aspect view
provides a more faithful rendering of Kant’s texts. Although I agree with Watkins
that Kant’s treatment of the matter is too ambiguous to determine the decision
by means of textual arguments alone,60 it is, nevertheless, important to look at
Kant’s remarks on the issue, as they guide much of the theoretical debate. Since
the existence of objects is determined by a category of the understanding, which
applies only to phenomena, the attribution of objectivity61 to the noumena would
constitute a category mistake. Hence, we should heed Kant’s repeated warnings
that the noumenon functions negatively, as a limit concept of empirical knowledge.
The thing in itself is the unintelligible remainder that results after abstracting an
object from all of its empirical properties. Thus, it functions as an “object” only
in a heuristic sense, rather than in the ordinary empirical sense. I believe that this
approach allows for a two-aspect reading of many passages where Kant seems to be
advocating the two-world view. Watkins cites Kant’s Lectures on Metaphysics to
59Kant’s distinction between the intelligible and empirical cause of an event bears some similarity
to Aristotle’s formal and efficient causes. The intelligible cause is not the efficient cause of any event
in the world, but it could be understood as a formal cause.
60Watkins, Kant and the Metaphysics of Causality, 318.
61I wish to use this word in the sense of Gegenständlichkeit (object-hood or concreteness) rather
than strictly as Objektivität (objectivity understood as independence from subjective distortion).
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bolster the two-world position:62
And thus the antinomy that there is freedom and necessity in the world
is removed because it is shown that they are not actual opposites <op-
posita>, because they apply to different objects, namely the first to the
noumenal world <mundus noumenon> and the other to the phenomenal
world <mundus phaenomenon>. (29:924-925; emphasis added)63
Here, Kant seems to claim that the resolution to the third antinomy indeed rests on
an ontological distinction between noumena and phenomena. I believe, however, that
this interpretation is misleading. Properly understood, an “object” of the noumenon
is not really an object in any ordinary sense of the word. Kant writes:
The division of objects into phaenomena and noumena, and of the world
into a world of sense and a world of understanding, can therefore not
be permitted at all, although concepts certainly permit of division into
sensible and intellectual ones; for one cannot determine any object for
the latter, and therefore also cannot pass them off as objectively valid.
(A255/B311; emphasis added)
Because there are no objects given for the world of understanding (i.e., no thing in
itself can serve as object), we are compelled to adopt the conception of the noumena,
as an essential heuristic, which facilitates the two-aspect reading of the texts where
Kant employs what appears to be two-world language. For example, the following
passage from the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals is often cited as textual
support for the two-world view:
This must yield a distinction, although a crude one, between a world of
sense [Sinnenwelt ] and the world of understanding [Verstandeswelt ],
the first of which can be very different according to the difference of
sensibility in various observers of the world, while the second, which is
its basis, always remains the same. (4:451)
62Ibid.
63Immanuel Kant, Lectures on Metaphysics, trans. Karl Ameriks and Steve Naragon (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1997), 223-224.
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If we consider the world of understanding as a heuristic limit concept, rather than a
distinct ontological realm, then this passage does not actually support the two-world
view. It is worth noting Kant’s qualification that this is a crude distinction [rohe
Unterscheidung ], suggesting that he might be using the two-world language heuris-
tically. Arguably, Kant uses the two-world language to help the reader understand
how to conceive of existence from two radically different perspectives. Indeed, the
concept of world [Welt ] often serves this function in Kant’s philosophy.64
Later in the Groundwork, Kant argues that the world of understanding [Ver-
standeswelt ] indeed functions heuristically and that it is “only a standpoint [Stand-
punkt ], that reason sees itself constrained to take outside appearances in order to
think of itself as practical ” (4:458). Because an individual cannot conceive of free-
dom from an empirical standpoint, the world of understanding offers a conceptual
apparatus that helps the reader overcome this difficulty. At times, Kant seems to
explicitly support this two-aspect reading of the two-world language:
A rational being must regard himself as intelligence (hence not from the
side of his lower powers) as belonging not to the world of sense but to
the world of understanding; hence he has two standpoints from which he
can regard himself. (4:452; emphasis added).
Here, Kant says that our membership in these distinct worlds is relevant insofar as it
allows us to regard ourselves from different standpoints. Although my interpretation
of these texts lends itself to the two-aspect view, proponents of the two-world view
make similar moves in defense of their position, and it is therefore necessary to rely
on theoretical arguments. These texts, however, play an important role in helping
us navigate the philosophical arguments produced in the interest of making Kant’s
view theoretically tenable.
64See Allison, Kant’s Theory of Freedom, 227-228.
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3.3 Objections to the Two-Aspect View
If Hudson is right that Wood’s two-world view makes it impossible to endorse
timeless agency and simultaneity, then given Kant’s commitment to the latter posi-
tions, it is necessary to abandon the two-world position in favor of the two-aspect
view. Although proponents of the two-world view sometimes acknowledge the legit-
imacy of this objection, they often reply that the two-aspect view faces even more
formidable objections, thus placing the argumentative burden back on the two-aspect
proponents.
Watkins raises just such an objection. The objections that he gives, however,
are leveled against a version of the two-aspect solution that is diametrically opposed
to my own. He believes that the advantage of the two-aspect solution is that the
contradiction between freedom and determinism can never be formulated because it
is impossible to view an action from these differing standpoints at the same time.65
Watkins objects that there is no clear reason why the two standpoints are incom-
mensurable and that it is entirely possible to hold them at the same time. I would
readily concede this objection, as it essentially bolsters my position. However, if
we are in agreement that the agent can hold these standpoints simultaneously, then
why does Watkins think that the two-aspect view is committed to the claim that we
cannot hold the two standpoints at the same time?
He argues that if there is only one reality, then there would be no way of avoiding
the contradiction that results from predicating freedom and determinism of one and
the same entity.66 Again, I would argue that this is not the understanding of the two-
world solution that I am advocating. I would assent to the claim that there is only
one reality—the empirical world. This does not mean, however, that we must ascribe
65Watkins, Kant and the Metaphysics of Causality, 320.
66Ibid., 322-323.
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freedom and determinism to the empirical self. Rather, there are two standpoints
from which we can evaluate the one reality. First, it can be considered qua empirical
reality, and the self is causally determined when seen from this perspective. Second,
there are the transcendental conditions which make the empirical phenomenon pos-
sible. The noumenal self, which is independent of time and causality, is just such a
condition. Thus, there is still no contradiction. It is not as if one and the same self
is free and determined in the same respect at the same time. The two-aspect view
allows us to understand the different respects in which the self is free and determined.
Watkins also objects that the two-aspect view gives rise to questions about
whether both standpoints can be true at the same time or if one of them must
be illusory.67 Earlier, for textual reasons, I rejected the possibility that one cause is
real, while the other is illusory. Thus, I would extend this reply to this objection. I
see no reason why it should be impossible for both standpoints to be true. Although
I believe that we can legitimately ascribe existence only to the empirical self, we can
still make truthful claims about the noumenal self, as long as these claims are un-
derstood as transcendental conditions of the empirical. This way, the noumenon can
continue to serve as a legitimate referent, even though it is not one that obtains as an
object in the empirical world. If the empirical self is temporal and the noumenal self,
which is a condition of its possibility, is atemporal, then the self (understood empiri-
cally) is causally necessitated, while the noumenal self, as a transcendental condition
of the empirical, is not. Thus, we cannot legitimately ask whether or not an agent
is really free, unless it is clear which perspective of the self is being considered.
This is also the objection that Watkins raises in response to Hudson. Watkins
argues that Hudson does not adequately explain the relationship between free action
67Ibid., 322.
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descriptions and natural event descriptions.68 Watkins says that if the descriptions
are truly incompatible, then it becomes difficult to explain “how Hudson can maintain
his version of the double-aspect interpretation of transcendental idealism (according
to which both free action and natural event descriptions are true).”69 This objection
is essentially a reformulation of the objection given earlier. How can the incompat-
ible positions of the two standpoints both be true? I believe that the objection is
predicated on a faulty premise. Watkins argues that if these two incompatible asser-
tions are attributed to a single ontological entity, then a contradiction is unavoidable.
This overlooks the important move made by the two-aspect theory, which attributes
freedom and necessity to two different aspects of one reality.
It seems that much of the difficulty stems from what it is meant by “standpoint.”
Watkins cites an article from Dana Nelkin in which she argues that although such
discussion seems coherent, the idea of a standpoint is ultimately unintelligible.70
Nelkin acknowledges that in ordinary discourse, we talk about standpoints all the
time. As an example, she talks about an instance in which someone believes p from
her point of view as an American citizen, but she believes not-p from the point
of view of a religious person.71 Nelkin argues that this talk can and should be
reformulated in such a way that we no longer need to mention standpoints. Nelkin
offers three ways of eliminating the idea of standpoints in the context of her example.
First, “when she limits her considerations to those concerning the principles of the
68Eric Watkins, review of Kant’s Compatibilism, by Hud Hudson, International Studies in Phi-
losophy 31 (1999), 148.
69Ibid. Admittedly, Watkins is not merely objecting to Hudson’s two-aspect compatibilism;
rather, he is specifically responding to Hudson’s extension of Donald Davidson’s token-token iden-
tity to Kant’s compatibilism — a position that Hudson builds from his expansion of Ralf Meerbote’s
work. While I find Hudson’s move interesting, insofar as it employs a modern form of compatibilism
to help us understand the two-aspect view of freedom, my position in this paper is not connected
with this claim.
70Nelkin, “Two Standpoints,” 569.
71Ibid.
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United States Constitution, she concludes p, and when she limits her considerations
to those concerning the tenets of her religion, she concludes not-p.”72 Nelkin objects
that this is not helpful since it does not allow us to infer what decision will be
made. Second, “she might be undecided about which set of considerations takes
precedence, and so is uncertain about which conclusion to draw.”73 Again, the same
problem of underdetermination would apply. Third, she might hold contradictory
beliefs, and Nelkin argues that this can be explained without recourse to discussion
of standpoints. Strangely, Nelkin admits that the last alternative is plausible only if
another explanation can be found, yet she offers no such explanation.
I believe that this project of reducing talk about standpoints to other terms is
neither desirable nor successful. I do not think that Nelkin’s first two alternatives give
us any reason to dismiss the idea of standpoints, as long as we are comfortable with
the idea that no decision can be inferred regarding which one is the real standpoint.
This is not a problem for Kant’s view of freedom, since both descriptions must be
true. Furthermore, I see no simple way of removing standpoints from the third
alternative. If someone is committed to two contradictory beliefs, then this is best
explained by the qualification that the beliefs are held from different standpoints.
Perhaps the issue can be better understood by looking at a simpler example of
differing standpoints. An object like a spoon is seen as concave from one standpoint,
and it is convex from another. If we were to look at the profile of the spoon, we
could see that it is both concave and convex, depending on which standpoint the
observer adopts. Transcendental idealism provides the resources that allow us to see
just such a profile of the self. The self is seen as free from one standpoint, while
it is seen as determined from the other. In this example, there is no simple way of
72Ibid.
73Ibid.
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reducing the relevance of the observer’s standpoint. Thus, there is a clear answer
to Watkins’ question as to how both standpoints can have true beliefs at the same
time. Transcendental idealism compels us to accept the veracity of both claims.
Nevertheless, Nelkin argues that the idea of standpoints faces theoretical chal-
lenges even if it is true that we hold beliefs from certain standpoints.74 She raises two
main objections. First, she argues that there are no clear criteria that allow us to sort
various beliefs according to the standpoint from which they are believed. Second,
she claims that if such criteria were found, this would not ultimately resolve the ir-
rationality involved in believing two contradictory propositions. Nelkin’s objections,
however, are predicated on a different interpretation of what kind of standpoints are
at stake. Nelkin grounds her analysis of standpoints on Christine Korsgaard’s dis-
tinction between the deliberative standpoint, which we adopt when making practical
decisions, and the metaphysical standpoint, which we use when scientifically exam-
ining empirical events.75 I argue that Nelkin’s objections can be answered if the issue
is shifted from these standpoints to the two epistemological standpoints that I have
discussed.
Korsgaard argues that we must consider ourselves as free when we are engaged in
practical deliberation of moral issues, while we see that we are determined when we
consider ourselves from a metaphysical perspective.76 Because practical considera-
tions are often intertwined with empirical ones, Nelkin argues that in many instances,
we are unable to distinguish between the two.77 She then argues that even if the
distinction could be clearly articulated, that it would still be irrational to believe
74Ibid., 570.
75Ibid., 567-568.
76Christine Korsgaard, “Morality as Freedom” in Yirmiyahu Yovel, Kant’s Practical Philosophy
Reconsidered: Papers Presented at the Seventh Jerusalem Philosophical Encounter (Dordrecht:
Kluwer Academic, 1986), 37-38.
77Nelkin, “Two Standpoints,” 570.
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that we are free when making practical deliberations, while denying this freedom
when undertaking a metaphysical inquiry.78 While Korsgaard is by no means wrong
to underscore Kant’s claim that we must assume that we are free when we make
moral decisions, the importance of the noumenal standpoint should not be restricted
to his practical philosophy. The third antinomy examines the issue merely in its
theoretical, metaphysical context. Thus, Nelkin’s focus is overly restrictive. In the
third antinomy, Kant is not arguing that we should assume that we are free for moral
reasons, while rejecting freedom metaphysically. On the contrary, he is showing that
freedom is theoretically compatible with determinism because he believes that free-
dom can serve as a practical postulate only after this possibility has been shown in
the Critique of Pure Reason.
Nelkin is right that it would be irrational to assume that we are free only in the
context of moral deliberation. Kant would be making a thoroughly dubious move if
he argued that we should falsely assume that we are free when evaluating practical
concerns, while simultaneously rejecting this freedom for metaphysical reasons. The
deliberative standpoint, however, is not the only standpoint from which we must
view ourselves as transcendentally free. Kant argues that transcendental freedom
must be a metaphysically tenable position. When undergoing practical deliberation,
we can legitimately assume that we are free only because this freedom can be made
consistent with the natural, causal necessity that accompanies empirical observation.
This mitigates the irrationality that Nelkin ascribes to the two-standpoint view.
4. Concluding Remarks
Given the vast importance of transcendental freedom in Kant’s philosophy, the
reader is compelled to find an interpretative approach that can support this view.
78Ibid.
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As Hudson argues, the two-world view makes it impossible to understand how we
can simultaneously understand an action as both free and determined. Thus, the
two-aspect view has an important theoretical advantage over the two-world view.
Watkins’ objections against the two-aspect view attack what I believe to be a weaker,
textually unfaithful version of the two-aspect theory. Additionally, in contrast to
Nelkin, I argue that the idea of a standpoint is not reducible and that without it we
cannot understand how it is possible to hold two true beliefs that would otherwise
be contradictory. Because the objections to the two-world view are more formidable
than the objections to the two-aspect view, we have good reason to reject the two-
world view in favor of the two-aspect view. If we endorse the two-world view, which
stands on a shaky theoretical foundation, then Kant’s practical philosophy, insofar
as it requires transcendental freedom, would be doomed to failure.
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4. FREEDOM IN THE CRITIQUE OF JUDGMENT:
BRIDGING THE GAP FROM NATURE TO FREEDOM
In the Introduction to the Critique of Judgment, Kant articulates the need to
bridge the “incalculable gulf fixed between the domain of the concept of nature, as
the sensible, and the domain of the concept of freedom, as the supersensible” (5:175-
176).79 Nature grounds theoretical cognition, which is legislated by the faculty of
the understanding, and freedom grounds practical concepts, which are governed by
reason (5:176). Kant claims that even though freedom and nature are governed by
different laws, there must be some unity between them so that freedom can realize its
ends in the sensible realm of nature. Kant says that one aim of the third Critique is
to demonstrate how the faculty of judgment can serve as the intermediary between
these two concepts. In the service of this aim, he argues that the purposiveness
of nature, which emerges as a crucial part of the connection between nature and
freedom, has its origin in the reflecting power of judgment (5:181).
This purposiveness allows for the possibility of a harmony between natural laws
and the ends given to nature by freedom. This harmony, however, is not equivalent
to the compatibility of freedom and causal necessity, which was already worked out
in the third antimony of the Critique of Pure Reason. Rather than describing the
different perspectives from which we can view ourselves as free and determined, the
third Critique describes how freedom and nature are unified into a systematic whole.
This unification is made possible by teleological judgments of nature, which allow us
to conceive of it as purposive. The highest good, which yields a direct proportioning
of virtue and happiness, is an end that is set by freedom, but it cannot be realized in
the sensible world unless nature is purposive in such a way that this unity is possible.
79All translations of the Critique of Judgment are taken fromtaken from Immanuel Kant, Critique
of the Power of Judgment, trans. by Paul Guyer (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press,
2000).
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Accordingly, the purposiveness of nature is conducive for producing a rational hope
for the highest good. Kant asserts this connection in his argument for the final end
of nature.
In Part Two of the Critique of Judgment, where Kant discusses teleological judg-
ment, he begins by examining the purposiveness that we perceive in individual ob-
jects in nature (e.g., birds, rivers, and trees). In the appendix to the teleology section,
Kant says that these considerations, when extended to the whole of nature, give rise
to the concept of the ultimate and final ends of nature.80 Not only are individual ob-
jects seen as purposive, but nature as a whole must also have an end. Because every
sensible object of nature is conditioned, the final end, which must be unconditioned,
necessarily lies outside of the system of nature (5:435).
Kant claims that the final end has nothing other than itself as the condition of
its possibility (5:434). The human being, insofar as it is considered as a thing in
itself, is the only being that can determine its own unconditioned ends. Thus, Kant
concludes that the human being must serve as the final end of nature. He writes:
The being of this sort is the human being, though considered as noumenon:
the only natural being in which we can nevertheless cognize, on the basis
of its own constitution, a supersensible faculty (freedom) and even the
law of the causality together with the object that it can set for itself the
highest end (the highest good in the world) . . . which therefore makes
him alone capable of being a final end, to which the whole of nature is
teleologically subordinated. (5:435-436).
The human being is given this privileged status because it is the only natural creature
that has been endowed with the supersensible faculty of freedom. It is interesting to
note that freedom, whose ostensible conflict with nature is the impetus behind the
third Critique, is also the culmination of the teleological structure of nature.
80Kant makes a distinction between the ultimate end (letzter Zweck) of nature, which is human
happiness and culture, and the final end (Endzweck), which is the realization of the highest good
in the world, as an end that human freedom sets for itself (5:426-436).
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In this section, I argue that the main aim of the third Critique is to provide
an account of judgment that grounds the teleological structure of nature such that
it is receptive to the ends of freedom. Furthermore, I claim that freedom plays
two important functions in this text. First, because its ends must be realized in
nature, freedom is a large part of the motivation behind Kant’s teleological account
of nature. Second, freedom is the reason that the human being is given the privileged
status as the final end of nature. The highest good, which Kant explicates in the
second Critique, is the highest end that freedom can set for itself, and nature must
be structured in such a way that it can permit the actualization of this end. I argue
that Kant’s practical philosophy is the driving force behind the Critique of Judgment
and that the concept of freedom should be seen as the keystone of the entire text.
4.1 The Incalculable Gulf between Nature and Freedom
In the introductions to both the first and section edition of the third Critique
Kant discusses the gap that exists between nature and freedom (5:175-6 and 20:202).
The Critique of Pure Reason describes the concept of nature, which grounds all
theoretical cognition according to the faculty of the understanding. Insofar as an
object is considered empirically, it is subject to the categories of the understanding,
which attribute causal necessity to all phenomena. The Critique of Practical Reason
treats the issue of freedom, which grounds all practical considerations in the faculty
of reason. Because practical precepts are determined by supersensible freedom, they
are not subject to the causal necessity of nature. Nevertheless, if freedom is to be
given any objective efficacy in the sensible world, then the ends that it determines
(through the moral law) must be realizable in nature. The Critique of Judgment
is meant to demonstrate how the faculty of judgment can bridge this gap that is
created by the first two Critiques.
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Near the end of the Critique of Pure Reason Kant famously posed the three
questions that exhaust the interests of reason. He asked, “1. What can I know?
2. What should I do? 3. What may I hope?” (A805/B833). The first question is
answered in the Critique of Pure Reason, and the second is answered the Critique of
Practical Reason. The connection of the third question to the Critique of Judgment,
however, is somewhat more ambiguous. The connection between them ultimately
lies in Kant’s conception of the highest good. Kant says that the highest good
results in a direct proportioning of happiness and virtue and thus reformulates the
third question to say, “If I do what I should, what may I then hope?” (A805/B833).
Although virtuous action makes one worthy of happiness, there is no guarantee that
it will yield actual happiness. Kant believes that “happiness must be conceived of as
realizable in nature, thus as requiring a unity of the systems of nature and freedom.”81
It is the practical philosophy, particularly the highest good, which motivates the need
to bridge the gap between nature and freedom. When Kant first raises the issue of
the “incalculable gap,” he notes that it cannot be bridged by theoretical reason;
rather, as Paul Guyer puts it, the gap “can and must be bridged by the practical use
of freedom.”82
If a practical consideration (viz., freedom) closes the gap, then why must the
Critique of Judgment take up the task of uniting freedom and nature? Kant writes:
The power of judgment, provides the mediating concept between the
concepts of nature and the concept of freedom, which makes possible
the transition from the purely theoretical to the purely practical, from
lawfulness in accordance with the former to the final end in accordance
with the latter, in the concept of a purposiveness of nature; for thereby
is the possibility of the final end, which can become actual only in nature
and in accord with its laws, cognized. (5:196)
81Paul Guyer, Kant’s System of Nature and Freedom: Selected Essays (Oxford: Clarendon, 2005),
282.
82Ibid., 294.
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The gap between nature and freedom can only be bridged through the purposiveness
of nature. If the laws of nature are the causes of our inclinations, pleasure, and pain,
then there is no assurance that these mechanistic laws have any connection with the
laws of freedom (i.e., the moral law). This means that without a connection between
nature and freedom, the virtuous have no reason to hope for happiness in the sensible
realm of nature.
There is an additional interest in establishing the unity of nature and freedom.
Without this unity, certain claims of the moral philosophy would no longer be tenable.
For example, in the second Critique, Kant discusses the feeling of pleasure that comes
from overpowering one’s inclinations in conformity with the moral law, which must
be the product of both nature and freedom (5:161). Pleasure is typically nothing
more than a natural phenomenon, but if pleasure can be caused by the moral exercise
of freedom, then there must be an intersection between nature and freedom. Kant
seeks to establish the purposiveness of nature, which will ultimately connect nature
and freedom by means of its final end.
The deduction of this purposiveness, however, lies outside the scope of both prac-
tical and theoretical reason. Theoretical reason is restricted to an account of nature
within the limits of the understanding, which merely describes the conditions that
give rise to our experience of nature. Because theoretical reason remains agnostic
about the existence of God and the reality of freedom, the possibility of the highest
good is grounded only by the presuppositions espoused by practical reason. Thus,
Kant postulates God’s existence and the immortality of the soul in the second Cri-
tique. In the Critique of Practical Reason, the highest good can only be achieved
by means of these postulates. The purposiveness of nature, which also sustains the
possibility of the highest good in the world, goes beyond the claims of practical and
theoretical reason; it must find its a priori principle in another faculty. Hence it
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is the power of judgment that serves as the ground for an a priori concept of the
purposiveness of nature—a concept that lies outside the scope of both theoretical
and practical reason.
This means, however, that the gap between nature and freedom, which is to be
bridged by the purposive account of nature, must be importantly distinct from the
related issues in the first two Critiques. Kant already demonstrated the possible
compatibility of freedom and nature in the third antinomy of the first Critique, and
he showed the objective reality of freedom from the practical point of view in the
second Critique. What gap remains, then, between freedom and nature? Paul Guyer
and Michael Rohlf argue that the gap must be between our natural inclination to
pursue happiness and our moral sensibilities, which often compel us to act against the
interests of such inclinations.83 According to Guyer and Rohlf, the aim of the Critique
of Judgment is to give an account of nature that will foster the moral disposition of
human beings, who are subject to the laws of both nature and freedom.
Because we are torn between our natural inclinations and our obligations to the
moral law, Rohlf argues that Kant is trying to find an a priori principle of judgment
that connects happiness to moral dispositions. Rohlf writes:
Kant needed to write a third Critique because he realized that he needs
an a priori – that is to say, a universal and necessary – principle for the
human capacity to feel pleasure and displeasure in order to explain how
it is possible for each of us to develop a moral disposition.84
Rohlf argues that an immoral agent has no reason to develop a moral disposition
unless she has cause to believe that her virtue will be rewarded with happiness, as
the highest good seems to promise. Although Rohlf’s account offers a viable theory
83See Michael Rohlf. “The Transition from Nature to Freedom in Kant’s Third Critique,” Kant-
Studien 99 (2008), 344. See also Paul Guyer. Kant and the Experience of Freedom: Essays on
Aesthetics and Morality. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 27-33.
84Rohlf, “Nature to Freedom,” 359.
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that connects the third Critique to Kant’s moral philosophy, there are alternative
possibilities which, unlike Rohlf’s do not risk slipping into moral theory that requires
contingent assumptions about psychology.
For instance, Kant might wish to show the possibility of the highest good simply
so that it is rational to hope for it. If nature was incapable of effecting the highest
good, then we would have no reason to hope for its realization, but this does not
entail that we should develop a moral disposition because we hope that happiness
will reward our virtue. On the contrary, Kant goes to great lengths to offer a moral
theory that relies in no way upon such empirical, contingent claims about psychology.
The question may arise, however, as to whether or not the possibility of the
highest good is in need of further support, since it was already posited in the second
Critique. In the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant says that “the highest good in
the world is possible only insofar as a supreme cause of nature having a causality
in keeping with the moral disposition is assumed” (5:125). This is why Kant claims
that God is a necessary postulate that is required for the possibility of the highest
good. However, in his general remark on the postulates of practical reason, Kant
qualifies the scope of the postulates. Freedom, the immortality of the soul, and
God’s existence are only objectively valid with respect to practical considerations
(5:133). Arguably, the third Critique is an attempt to demonstrate the possibility of
the highest good without reference to postulates which are only justified within the
confines of practical reason.
The Critique of Judgment seeks to extend the claims of practical reason into a
new domain. While Kant does not wish to argue that the postulates of practical
reason should be granted objective validity by theoretical reason, he does want to
give an account of nature that solidifies the claims he makes about our prospects
for hope. Kant discusses the inculcation of moral values in society. He looks at
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moral education of children as a salient example. While the first task is showing the
child what it means to have an action conform to the moral law, the second task is
demonstrating the importance of performing the action “for the sake of the moral
law” (5:159). It is here, at the close of the second Critique that Kant begins sketch
the need for the third Critique. He claims that the pupil can achieve this second goal
only when his “attention is fixed on the consciousness of his freedom” (5:160). This is
crucial for moral development, because the worthiness of happiness that is achieved
through virtue, intersects with actual happiness, when “the duty of the law, through
the positive worth that observance of it lets us feel, finds easier access through the
respect for ourselves in the consciousness of our own freedom” (5:161). The dignity
and respect that we garner for ourselves is achieved through the moral exercise of
our freedom. Nevertheless, this exercise of reason is limited to the practical domain.
Thus, the incalculable gap between freedom and nature remains. Nature must be
structured such that the moral employment of freedom and the development of virtue
yield actual happiness in the sensible world. This, as was noted earlier, requires a
purposive account of nature.85
4.2 The Teleological Concept of Nature
Kant claims that judgment is divided into two distinct powers, both of which
are bound up with the idea of purposiveness. The aesthetic power of judgment is
exercised in the domain of the formal, subjective purposiveness, which gives rise to
our feelings of pleasure and displeasure. The teleological power of reflective judgment
is the faculty that judges the real, objective purposiveness of nature (5:193). It is
85In the Doctrine of Method in the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant acknowledges the role
of judgment in this process. It was not until the time of the publication of the second Critique,
however, that Kant discovered the a priori principle that drove him to write the third Critique,
which he had originally titled the “Critique of Taste.” See John H. Zammito, The Genesis of Kant’s
Critique of Judgment (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 2-8.
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on the basis of this distinction that Kant divides the third Critique into its two
parts. Part One, which is restricted to the aesthetic power of judgment, deals with
our experience of the beautiful and the sublime. Part Two, which focuses on the
teleological power of judgment, turns our attention to the objective purposiveness of
nature. It is primarily in Part Two that Kant shows how this objective purposiveness
of nature establishes the connection between nature and freedom via the highest
good.86
Kant begins Part Two by introducing a distinction between relative and internal
purposiveness (5:366). Nature exhibits relative purposiveness when it produces some-
thing that is useful for human beings or advantageous for other creatures (5:367).
More importantly, however, an organism demonstrates internal purposiveness, as a
natural end, on the condition that it is “the cause and effect of itself” (5:371). Kant
takes the example of a tree, which meets three important conditions that demon-
strate its existence as a natural end. First, a tree is structured in such a way that it
generates other trees, propagating its own species. Thus, its reproductive function is
self-generating insofar as it is preserves its kind. Second, the tree contains the seeds
of its own growth. All of its nutritional, photosynthetic mechanisms are internal to
its structure and have nothing other than the tree itself as its own end in this regard.
Third, the parts of the tree are reciprocally dependent on each other. The connec-
86Although it lies outside the scope of this paper, there is an interesting relationship between his
moral philosophy and Part One of the Third Critique. In particular, Kant discusses the connection
between the sublime and our moral sensibilities (5:268-269). For an excellent discussion of this
connection, see Robert R. Clewis, The Kantian Sublime and the Revelation of Freedom (Cambridge,
U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 126-146. Though I will not make the argument here, I
would contend that the real importance of the beautiful and the sublime is found in their capacity to
awaken in us a certain moral sensibility. Kant seems to explicitly affirm this contention. At the end
of Part One, Kant says that “taste is at bottom a faculty for the judging of the sensible rendering of
moral ideas” (5:356). Additionally, Kant’s Analytic of the Beautiful provides an interesting account
of the harmony between the freedom of the imagination and and lawfulness of the understanding.
Although this seems less relevant for the claims concerning the highest good, it is yet another way
in which freedom and lawfulness can be unified.
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tion between the roots and leaves, for example, demonstrates its constitution as an
organism (i.e., the parts are dependent on the whole and vice versa). The tree is its
own cause and effect. The causal mechanisms that produce the leaves are internal
to the organism, but the telos of the leaves is the sustenance of the tree. The leaves
depend on the tree for their existence, but the tree must in turn depend on the leaves
for its existence. Kant concludes that these observations, although they deal with
natural phenomena, are strictly within the domain of the faculty of judgment. He
writes:
The concept of a thing as in itself a natural end is therefore not a con-
stitutive concept of the understanding or of reason, but it can still be a
regulative concept for the reflecting power of judgment, for guiding re-
search in accordance with a remote analogy with our own causality in
accordance with ends. (5:375)
The judgment of organisms as natural ends is an integral part of the connection
between freedom and nature. In Section III, I discuss how this kind of judgment is
writ large onto the whole of nature, which gives rise to the concept of the final end
of nature.
The teleological structure of organisms leads Kant to the conception of an intel-
ligent author of nature. He writes:
We cannot form any concept at all of the possibility of such a world
except by conceiving of such an intentionally acting supreme cause. Ob-
jectively, therefore, we cannot establish the proposition that there is an
intelligent original being; we can establish it only subjectively for the use
of our power of judgment in its reflection upon the ends in nature, which
cannot be conceived in accordance with any other principle than that of
an intentional causality of a highest cause. (5:399)
Although our faculty of judgment yields a purposive conception of nature, this does
not prove the objective reality of God. Rather, the supposition of God’s existence is
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a subjectively necessary condition of the purposiveness of nature. As Guyer puts it,
“we see that the peculiar complexity of individual organisms makes it necessary for us
to conceive of them as if they were products of intelligent design.”87 This conception
of an intelligent author of organisms is later extended to the whole of nature — a
crucial move that promotes nature’s receptivity to the highest good. Guyer writes:
The attempt to comprehend individual organisms in nature also makes it
natural for us to conceive of nature as a whole as a system that is designed
by an intelligent author, and must therefore have or be compatible with
a final end.88
Since the first Critique demonstrated the possibility of freedom and God’s existence
and the second Critique proved their objective validity from the perspective of prac-
tical reason, it is left to the third Critique to show how these ideas can be unified in
nature’s purposiveness, which ultimately leads to the final end of nature.
4.3 The Final End of Nature
In the “Critique of the Teleological Power of Judgment,” Kant argues for the
existence of the final end of nature. He says that the claim of natural ends, which
was demonstrated in his explanation of natural organisms, rests upon the possibility
of a “final end (scopus) of nature, which requires the relation of nature to something
supersensible, which far exceeds all of our teleological cognition of nature; for the
end of the existence of nature itself must be sought beyond nature” (5:378). The
teleological power of judgment is restricted to the domain of nature, which cannot
contain anything supersensible. This provides the grounds for a possible intersection
between the sensible and the supersensible. Nature, which is sensible, must find its
final end outside of nature, in the supersensible. Freedom is, of course, the only
87Guyer, Nature and Freedom, 294.
88Ibid., 297.
47
supersensible faculty given to any natural creature, which can act as the bridge
between the sensible and supersensible.
Before demonstrating the existence of a final end (Endzweck), Kant first argues
that the human being is also the ultimate end (letzter Zweck) of nature. The ultimate
ends of nature are human happiness and culture (5:429). Kant acknowledges that
the human being, as a natural creature, is by no means favored by nature. The
destructive natural forces of hunger, floods, cold, attacks by animals, and disease
are more than enough to demonstrate this fact. Thus, the sense in which man’s
happiness is the ultimate end of nature must be distinguished from this natural idea
of happiness. Kant writes:
As the sole being on earth who has reason, and thus a capacity to set
voluntary ends for himself, he [the human being] is certainly the titular
lord of nature, and, if nature is regarded as a teleological system, then it
is his vocation to be the ultimate end of nature; but always conditionally,
that is, subject to the condition that he has the understanding and the
will to give to nature and to himself a relation to an end that can be
sufficient for itself independently of nature, which can thus be a final
end, which, however, must not be sought in nature at all. (5:431)
Although man is given no natural privileges compared to other animals, his privilege
is the possession of freedom, which allows him to appropriate nature for his own
ends. In particular, the human being is able to produce its own unconditioned
ends, completely independent from the laws of nature, and actualize these ends in
nature. It is here that the supersensible freedom and sensible nature intersect. The
human being is sensible insofar as she is an empirical object of nature, but she is
supersensible insofar as she is transcendentally free.
Kant says that “a final end is that end which needs no other as the condition of
its possibility” (5:434). There is, of course, no natural end, which does not in turn
depend on something else in nature as the condition of its possibility. Therefore,
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Kant argues that the final end must lie outside of nature. The mere existence of nat-
ural ends, which was demonstrated in Kant’s account of organisms, is not sufficient
for a determination of a final end of nature. This idea of natural ends was supple-
mented by the concept of an intelligent author, who guides the whole of nature as an
intentionally acting cause, which compels us to continue our teleological questioning
until the final end is discovered (5:434). Kant writes:
Now if the things in the world, as dependent beings as far as their ex-
istence is concerned, need a supreme cause acting in accordance with
ends, then the human being is the final end of creation; for without him
the chain of ends subordinated to one another would not be completely
grounded; and only in the human being, although in him only as a sub-
ject of morality, is unconditional legislation with regards to ends to be
found. (5:435-436)
The whole of nature, must find the condition of its possibility in a supreme cause
that acts in accordance with ends. The human being sets ends for itself by means
of maxims, the determination of which is not dependent on any empirical condition.
This unconditioned, transcendental freedom, is the only reason that the human being
can be simultaneously both sensible and supersensible. It is interesting to note Kant’s
claim that the human being can serve as the final end of nature only in his capacity
as a moral subject. As an object of the sensible world, the human being is not unlike
other animals, but the possession of reason (and thus freedom) elevate mankind
above the natural world.
This final end of nature, to which the whole of nature is subordinated, is the
motivation behind Kant’s teleology. Guyer writes, “morality requires us to take a
view of nature as well as reason as purposive, so the possibilities of the scientific
view of nature and the necessities of the moral view of nature ultimately coincide.”89
Morality, in its exercise of freedom, forges the bridge between the two contrasting
89Ibid., 298-299.
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views of nature. Kant argues that a world that has no rational beings would be a
world without value (4:449). Nature only has value insofar as its ultimate purpose is
to provide a world in which moral agents can realize their unconditioned ends. Kant
emphasizes the point again:
The moral law, as the formal rational condition on the use of our freedom,
obligates us by itself alone, without depending on any sort of end as a
material condition; yet it also determines for us, and indeed does so a
priori, a final end, to strive after which it makes obligatory for us, and
this is the highest good in the world possible through freedom. (5:450)
The heavy focus that Kant places on morality here at the end of the Critique of
Judgment is sometimes referred to as the “Ethical Turn.”90 This term, however, is
dangerously misleading. While it is true that the appendix to Part Two is the most
thorough exposition of this idea, these considerations were the core issue throughout
the entire text. The moral relevance of his teleology is by no means “tacked on” to
the end of the account; rather, man’s purpose in nature “had been at stake all along
in the Third Critique.”91 Zammito is exactly right in saying that “the Third Critique
finds its decisive concerns neither in questions of beauty nor in questions of empirical
biology but rather in the ultimate questions of the place of man in the order of the
world—his freedom and his destiny.”92
Morality and freedom caused the problems that created the need for the third
Critique, but at the same time, they are a crucial part of the solution. The gap
could only be bridged by a purposive account of nature so that highest good would
be seen as a rational aspiration. In the second Critique the highest good requires
the practical postulates that Kant gives in the Dialectic, but the legitimacy of these
postulates is, of course, restricted to practical reason. Thus, it is the third Critique,
90Zammito, Genesis, 263.
91Ibid., 267.
92Ibid.
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through its purposive account of nature, that shows how it is rational to hope for the
equal proportioning of virtue and happiness even outside the confines of practical
reason.
4. Concluding Remarks
The gulf between nature and freedom, which motivates the third Critique, must
be seen as a question that remained unanswered by the first two Critiques. The
first Critique is always agnostic about freedom, as the third antinomy merely makes
room for the possibility of freedom. In the second Critique, Kant proves the objective
reality of freedom only insofar as it was necessitated by practical reason. But the
highest good, because it was only possible through various postulates, is still severed
from the sensible world. Thus, nature and freedom must be united in order to realize
the ends of the highest good. Without this unity, there would be no reason to think
that nature will ever place virtue and happiness in equal proportion.
This unity can only be achieved through a teleological account of nature that
provides a privileged position to human beings because of their faculty of freedom.
It is this supersensible power that makes the human being eligible for its status as
the final end of nature. Thus, freedom both creates and bridges the gap that the
third Critique sought to address.
Without freedom, nature would be nothing more than a collection of empirically
conditioned ends, blindly following the laws that causally necessitate their existence.
The faculty of reflective judgment gives rise to a different story — one in which
nature appears as the product of an intelligent author, who has structured it in such
a way that the moral ends of freedom can be realized in the sensible world. Here
lies the answer to Kant’s third question. We may hope that the unity of nature and
freedom will be receptive to the realization of the highest aim of human existence,
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namely, the highest good in the world.
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5. CONCLUSION
I believe that it would be impossible to overstate the importance of the concept of
freedom in Kant’s philosophy. Unsurprisingly, commentators have not failed to take
notice of the significance of this concept. Allison writes, “There can be little doubt
regarding the centrality of the concept of freedom in Kant’s ‘critical’ philosophy. . . it
is no exaggeration to claim that, at bottom, Kant’s critical philosophy is a philosophy
of freedom.”93 I have tried to highlight some of the important roles that freedom
plays in Kant’s three Critiques.
In the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant repeatedly emphasizes the importance
of freedom for his moral philosophy. I concur with Allison that freedom is a cru-
cial premise in the connection between the practical law and the moral law. As
Aune points out, this connection was not sufficiently established in the Groundwork.
Without transcendental freedom, it would be impossible to act on a maxim purely
because of its conformity with universal law.
The third antinomy of the Critique of Pure Reason laid the essential foundation
for the claims of the moral philosophy. Although Kant insists that speculative reason
(unlike practical reason) must remain agnostic about freedom, he nevertheless uses
the third antinomy to show that freedom is not impossible. On the contrary, he
argues that transcendental idealism makes it possible for freedom to be compatible
with causal necessity. I have argued that we must understand the division between
noumena and phenomena to be an epistemological one if the claims of the third
antinomy are to be viable at all.
The third Critique bridges the gap between the first two Critiques. Through
his teleological account of nature, Kant shows how reflective judgment gives rise to
an understanding of the world such that is not indifferent to the ends of freedom.
93Allison, Kant’s Theory of Freedom, 1.
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Rather, nature is teleologically subordinated to the moral use of human freedom.
Thus, Kant concludes that nature creates the possibility for the realization of the
highest good in the world.
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